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Integration with the European Union is the greatest challenge currently faced by Poland
and the Polish people. The process which was initiated in the early 1990s will change its
character and pace together with the beginning of the talks. It will become the source of many
challenges and dilemmas, questions and problems. During that period, romantic visions will be
confronted with the play of interests, and expectations with the outcome of the talks. Thus, the
attitude held by some of the people towards the integration may change.
The following report on the opinions held by the public on the eve of the launching of
the negotiations with the European Union, has been prepared by the Public Affairs Institute as
part of the research and analysis programme on the consequences of the integration. The
survey commissioned by the Public Affairs Institute was carried out on a representative sample
of 1066 members of adult Poles by the opinion research centre Pracownia Bada  Społecznych
from Sopot on 14-15 February 1998.
Main results
1. Poles approve of their country’s accession to the European Union, although they are
increasingly sceptical: there is a growing belief about an inequality in relations between
Poland and the European Union.
2. The people are to a large extent realistic as regards the time required for Poland to
become a fully fledged member of the Union: 57% of respondents hold the opinion that this
is going to take place by the year 2003.
3. There has been a clear delineation of the public’s attitudes towards the integration
process: both the group of supporters as well as a much less numerous group of opponents
of the process have been consolidated. At the same time, Poles have been finding it easier to
formulate opinions about the integration process.
4. Poles may be divided into two groups of a very similar size: one of the groups believes
that Poland is not well prepared for the talks with the European Union (44%), while the
Polish government is submissive to the Union (41%), whereas the second group has
confidence in the attitude of the government (38%) and in Poland’s readiness for the talks
(42%).
5. Most Poles hold the opinion that the integration process will have little or none impact
on their lives. Thus, the integration process is not approached from the perspective of
everyday life. It appears as a remote development occurring beyond the citizens.
36. Those who are convinced that the integration will effect their lives are mainly farmers
on the one hand, and respondents holding managerial positions on the other. Whereas the
process provokes fears among the former group, members of the latter group vest hopes in
the integration.
7. Educated people, young people, as well as unemployed, have high expectations related
to the integration process, hoping to solve their problems and to fulfil their aspirations.
8. Only one in four farmers approves of Poland’s accession to the European Union.
41. Approval for integration.
European integration is now the main goal of Poland’s foreign policy, along with the
achievement of NATO membership. The public’s approval for the integration processes is
necessary in order to enable an efficient implementation of that goal. The extent of that support
will be important for Polish negotiators during the talks with Brussels representatives, and will
be decisive if Poland’s accession to the Union were preceded by a nation-wide referendum.
One of the indicators of the social approval for the integration process is the way in
which respondents would vote in the referendum on Poland’s accession to the European
Union.
Table 1.
If a referendum were held in Poland on the
accession to the European Union, would you
vote:
opinion poll carried out
by the opinion research
centre CBOS in April
19971
survey by the Public
Affairs Institute (ISP)
carried out in February
1998
in favour of the accession 72 64
against the accession 11 9
will not vote in the referendum - 13
difficult to say 18 14
Most of the people are in favour of Poland’s accession to the European Union,
although some of them have no interest in the issue and are not going to take part in a possible
referendum.
The results of both surveys cannot be fully compared because the choice of possible
answers suggested in the ISP survey was broader: the respondents could choose between
voting for or against, but they could also declare a lack of interest in voting at all. It appears
necessary to take the latter option into account due to a repeated low turnout in the
parliamentary elections as well as in the property enfranchisement and constitutional referenda.
Therefore, the latest result provides a better illustration of the possible attitudes held by the
respondents towards integration.
Due to a limited extent in which the results of the two surveys may be compared, the
figures presented in Table 2 cannot be interpreted as a clear decline in support for integration.
                                               
1
 The report refers to the results of the CBOS poll conducted on a 1,000 quota sample in April 1997.
5Approval in the range of 64% proves that the integration process continues to enjoy quite a
high support.
Those respondents who definitely approve of Poland’s accession to the Union, support
a quick pace of the integration process. Therefore, the replies to the question about a desirable
moment for Poland’s accession to the Union provide an equally good reflection of the true
attitudes towards the entire process.
Table 2.
When, in your opinion, would it be best for
Poland to become a fully fledged member of the
European Union? CBOS 1996
2 ISP
February 1998
by the year 2000 already now - 35 40
in five years 37 25
in ten years 8 10
later than that 3 4
never 3 6
difficult to say 14 16
A majority of Poles (65%) would like Poland to join the European Union not later than
in five years, i.e., by the years 2003. Two years ago, the completion of integration within five
years was supported by 72% of respondents. This may prove a slight decline in support for the
entire integration process, and a gradual delineation of two groups of opinions: one clearly
approving of the integration process and wishing the process to take place as soon as possible
(an increase from 35% up to 40%), and the group holding a negative attitude (in ten years or
never: an increase from 14% up to 20%).
Poles are realistic in their assessments concerning the date of Poland’s accession to the
Union: 57% of respondents believe that the process will take place within five years.
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 The survey was conducted on a nation-wide representative sample of 1,154 adult Poles in May 1996.
6Table 3.
When, in your opinion, Poland will really become
a fully fledged member of the European Union?
CBOS 1996 ISP February 1998
by the year 2000 now - 6 17
in five years 49 55 40 57
in ten years 13 18
later than that 5 5
never 3 3
difficult to say 24 18
At the same time, two groups have grown in numbers: one comprised of optimists who
expect Poland to become a member of the Union by the year 2000, and the other one
consisting of pessimists who hold the opinion that Poland will become a member of the Union
in ten years. In addition to that, an increasing number of Poles are able to define the integration
in terms of time.
The growth in the number of replies “by the year 2000” may be explained with the fact
that the survey was conducted within a very short time from the launching of the negotiations.
This means that a vast part of the people associate the beginning of the talks with prospects for
soon integration. Those people may feel disappointed if the negotiations are prolonged.
Bearing in mind that both the Polish chief negotiator as well as representatives of the
European Union consider the five-year perspective the most likely one, one may say that the
Polish public share their opinion concerning the length of time required for Poland to be able
to become a fully fledged member of the European Union. Nevertheless, there is a lot of room
for an information campaign addressed to the group expecting the talks to produce quick
results, in order to prevent a growing impatience and frustration among the most ardent
supporters of the process.
The greatest support for Poland’s integration with the Union was expressed by the
unemployed, respondents aged between 18 and 24, college or university graduates, and public
sector workers. Only 25% of farmers approve of the accession to the European Communities.
2. Evaluation of relations with the EU and the consequences of integration.
The continuous high approval for the unification processes is accompanied by a
growing scepticism in the evaluation of the relations between Poland and the European Union
to date. In this case as well, a clear delineation has been observed in the opinions expressed by
7respondents, with a clear decline in the number of respondents who had no opinion on the
subject.
Table 4.
How do you evaluate the relations between Poland and the
European Union to date? Which side derives greater benefits?
CBOS 1996 ISP February 1998
the European Union countries 31 38
Poland 9 10
equally: Poland and the European Union 25 27
none 7 10
difficult to say 29 15
The largest group of respondents believe that the mutual relations bring more benefits
for the European Union than for Poland. The number of respondents holding that opinion has
clearly increased during the past two years.
The sceptical or cautious evaluation of Poland’s position with regard to the European
Union is even more manifest in the answers about the projected status of Poland after its
accession to the Union: a majority of respondents believe that Poland will become a second
class member.
Table 5.
Following the accession to the European Union, Poland will become: ISP February 1998
A really equal member of the organisation, the same as other member states 29
a second-class, weaker member, with a worse position 55
difficult to say 16
The projection concerning Poland’s worse position after the accession to the Union
does not mean a lack of approval for the integration. Nearly a half of those who are going to
vote in favour of Poland’s accession to the Union in a possible referendum, at the same time
hold the opinion that Poland will become a second class member. However, among the
respondents declaring their plans to vote against Poland’s membership in the European Union,
92% believe that Poland will be a second class member. In the future, a growing conviction
about Poland’s handicap in comparison to other member states and the country’s worse
position in the negotiations, may lead to a fall in approval for the integration process.
8As a rule, those who believe that Poland will become an equal member of the Union,
would like the country to join the organisation as soon as possible.
Table 6.
After Poland’s accession
to the European Union
the country will become:
a really equal member of
the organisation, just like
other EU countries
a second class member,
weaker, with a worse
position difficult to say
total 29 55 16
will vote in favour of the
accession
39 49 12
will vote against 4 92 4
won’t vote in the
referendum
11 67 48
Why does a large part of the public approve of the integration process despite the
conviction that Poland will have a low, weaker position? When thinking of Poland’s future, a
number of people were guided rather by their opinions concerning Poland’s current position in
Europe, and not by an assessment of the effects of the integration process. Those people were
referring to Poland’s civilisation and economic gap which cannot be made up for quickly, even
after the accession to the Union, and they did not refer to the potential results of the
negotiations. A different interpretation is also possible: for half of the people the integration
process will be advantageous enough to make to support it even if Poland is going to be a
weaker, worse member of the European Community.
According to some of the respondents, Poland’s future position will be determined by
the relative weakness of its economy in the competition with more advanced economies of the
EU countries. Therefore, a large group of people replied that it is necessary to ensure a
transition period for Polish companies. In addition to that, very strong fears were observed
among the people that many companies may go bankrupt in the future. Nonetheless, overall,
half of respondents (51%) believe that Polish companies will be able to meet the challenges
related to integration, provided that appropriate conditions are secured.
Table 7.
In your opinion, will most Polish companies manage to compete in the free
European market or not?
ISP February 1998
Yes, they will because Polish companies are sufficiently competitive 12
Yes, they will if they are provided a sufficiently long protection period 39
No, they will not, many of them will go out of business 38
difficult to say 11
9There is a strong connection between Poland’s projected position after the accession to
the Union, and the evaluation of competitiveness of the Polish economy. The largest group of
respondents believe that Poland will be a second-class member because Polish companies are
too week. On the other hand, optimists expect that Poland will be an equal member because
the economy will manage under the condition that appropriate protection periods are ensured.
The belief in the sufficient competitiveness of Polish companies is more often held by
college or university graduates, high income earners, respondents living in large cities,
respondents holding managerial positions, as well as supporters of the Freedom Union (UW)
and (less frequently) of Solidarity Elections Action (AWS). The supporters of protection
periods for Polish companies can be found most commonly among: younger respondents,
public sector workers, and respondents with average incomes. Just like in the first case, they
most often support the current government coalition, although the distribution of political
sympathies is surprisingly even among this group. Fears that most Polish companies will not
manage to face competition prevail clearly among farmers and unskilled workers, as well as
among the supporters of the Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland (ROP) and the PSL
peasant party.
Approval for social and economic decisions is usually pegged to their expected impact
on the everyday life of different social groups. Therefore, opinions concerning the effect of
particular reforms or decisions on the life of the citizens, and the extent of that impact, are of a
key importance.
A majority of respondents (63%) expect no or only small changes to occur in their lives
following Poland’s accession to the European Union.
Table 8.
Will Poland’s accession to the EU influence your life? ISP February 1998
Yes, it will be a significant influence. 22
Yes, it will, but to a small extent. 35
No, it will not have significant influence. 28
Difficult to say 14
Only less than a quarter of the people believe that European integration will produce a
major impact on their lives. Thus, the integration process is not approached from the everyday
life perspective. It appears to Poles as some distant issue dealt with beyond them.
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It is interesting to note that those who expect the integration to produce a major impact
on their lives are mostly members of groups which hold contrary attitudes towards European
issues. On the one hand, there are representatives of people holding managerial positions and
supporters of the Freedom Union (UW) (27%), and on the other, farmers and farm workers
(44%), and supporters of the PSL peasant party (34%). One group vests considerable hopes in
the process, while the other has serious fears. A clear trend was observed for younger people
and respondents with college or university diplomas to be more often convinced about the
great importance of integration.
Among those who believe that integration will have no major effect on their lives, a
majority are older people, people with little education, pensioners, but also, which is
interesting, people relatively well off in terms of their financial status.
Fears concerning negative consequences of the integration process in everyday life have
an impact on attitudes towards the European Union. The people who want to vote against the
accession more often tend to believe that Poland’s membership in the European Union will
influence their lives, whereas the supporters of the process hold the opinion that the influence
will not be a major one. Unwillingness to vote in the referendum stems from the belief that
integration will change nothing in the life of a given person.
However, on the whole, it is quite difficult to identify a clear correspondence between
the opinions concerning the individual consequences of integration with the opinions on other
issues connected to the European Union. The unification processes are very abstract for an
average citizen who finds it difficult to imagine their specific consequences.
3. Expectations towards negotiations between Poland and the European Union.
In view of the upcoming talks with the European Union, the level of information which
the public has been provided about the issue seems to be particularly important.
Table 9.
In your opinion, how well are you informed of the talks with the European
Union?
ISP February 1998
I feel very well informed 3
I feel well informed 20
I feel poorly informed 46
I feel very poorly informed 27
11
difficult to say 4
A great part of the people (73%) feel that they have not been adequately informed
about the negotiations. The evaluation of one’s own level of information is connected to the
attitude towards integration: people poorly informed more often think that we are being taken
advantage of by the Union and declare a lack of interest in taking part in an accession
referendum. Respondents who feel well informed view the relations between Poland and the
Union as equal and are going to vote en masse in favour of the accession. Thus good
information encourages approval for the European Union and the integration process. Or to
put it differently, people who have a positive attitude towards the Union are probably more
open to information and look for the information.
Opinions are divided as concerns the level of Poland’s readiness for the talks: the group
of people who believe that Poland is well prepared for the negotiations (42%) is almost as
large as the group holding the opposite opinion (44%).
Table 10.
In your opinion, is Poland well prepared for the talks with the
European Union?
ISP February 1998
definitely yes 3
rather yes 39
rather no 33
definitely no 11
difficult to say 14
People who consider themselves poorly informed believe that Poland is unprepared for
the talks, while respondents who positively evaluate their level of information consider the
country well prepared. Thus, the opinions concerning Poland’s readiness for the talks more
likely reflect deeper attitudes or illustrate attitudes towards the current government rather than
the true level of information.
A majority of supporters of the Freedom Union (UW), as well as of Solidarity
Elections Action (AWS) are convinced about Poland’s readiness for the talks. The most
negative opinions were clearly voiced by supporters of the Movement for the Reconstruction
of Poland (ROP), who are at the same time, along with the supporters of the PSL peasant
party, the most sceptical in their attitudes towards the integration process.
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College or university graduates tend to be more critical than average as regards
Poland’s readiness for the talks. In their case, this may be a result of high expectations and
requirements formulated towards the persons in charge of the negotiation process.
The belief that Poland is poorly prepared for the talks is strongly connected to the
belief that Poland will become a second class member after the accession to the Union. About
35% of the public hold that view and support integration at the same time. That paradox may
be explained by the fact that the key issue for the respondents in the context of preparations
for the talks, is the dynamism of the Polish economy. After all, the survey showed a very
strong connection between the opinion on the country’s readiness for the talks and the ability
of Polish companies to face competition in the European free market.
Confidence in the negotiation process is based to a large extent on the evaluation of
the government’s attitude towards the negotiating partner. According to a large group of
respondents, the current government is too submissive towards the Union, and only few people
think that the Polish authorities are firm in defending national interests.
Overall, negative attitudes (41%) are balanced with the positive ones: firm attitude and
ability to reconcile interests (38%).
Table 11.
What is your opinion on the present government’s attitude towards the European
Union:
ISP February
1998
firm in defending Polish interests 10
submissive to the Union’s demands 41
able to reconcile Polish and EU interests 28
difficult to say 21
The Polish authorities are accused of servility towards the Union by farmers, workers
employed in the trade sector, as well as the supporters of the PSL peasant party, the
Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) and the Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland (ROP).
Respondents supporting the SLD are guided rather by a hostility towards the centre right
government than towards the European Union. As a rule, among groups holding more
optimistic attitudes towards the integration prospects (students, respondents holding
managerial positions, white collar workers), respondents more often than others tended to
believe in the government’s skill in reconciling the interests of Poland and of the European
Union. The same opinion was held by a majority of supporters of the Freedom Union (UW).
A close relation was identified between the respondents’ attitude towards the
government and their opinion about Poland’s readiness for the talks. Those who believe that
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the country is well prepared for the negotiations, more often tend to consider the government
able to reconcile contradicting interests and to be firm in defending national interests. The
belief in the government’s submissive attitude towards the Union is often coupled by a poor
evaluation of Poland’s readiness for the talks. These opinions are comprised in a broader
outlook: a conviction that the world seeks to take advantage of Poland’s weak political and
economic position. A belief in the government’s submissive attitude and a poor evaluation of
the readiness for the talks are elements comprised within that attitude.
However, critical assessments of the government’s attitude are moderated by the belief
that Poland’s position with regard to the Union will be determined mainly by the advancement
of Polish reforms, and only to a much lesser extent, by the attitude of the Polish negotiators.
The largest group of respondents point to the need for Poland to undertake adjustment efforts
on its own, while only 31% support the determinist opinion that “little depends on us.”
Table 12.
In your opinion, the terms of Poland’s accession to the European Union
will mostly depend on:
ISP February 1998
the readiness, skills and firmness of Polish negotiators 20
the advancement of reforms and modernisation in Poland 35
political decisions of the EU member states 31
difficult to say 14
Farmers and farm workers more often tend to believe that the outcome of the
negotiations will depend on the EU countries and not on the efforts undertaken by the Polish
side. On the other hand, the opinion that reforms are the most important is surprisingly popular
among the unemployed.
The political orientation of particular groups of respondents is in quite a clear
connection with their opinions concerning the essence of the accession talks. Thus, supporters
of the Freedom Union (UW) much more often tended to point to the key importance of Polish
reforms, while supporters of the PSL peasant party placed stress on preparing Polish
negotiators and on the negotiators’ firm attitude. Supporters of Solidarity Elections Action
(AWS) tend to believe a little more often than the average that both the firm attitude of
negotiators and the advancement of reforms are important. On the other hand, the belief in the
importance of political decisions made by the EU countries is usually held by supporters of the
Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland (ROP) and of the Democratic Left Alliance
(SLD).
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This is quite a good reflection of the attitudes held by the political parties towards
European integration. The report published by the Public Affairs Institute last autumn
concerning the attitude of political parties towards Europe, reads,
“Beneath the uniform support declared for the integration process there is an array of
attitudes ranging between two different integration philosophies. According to the first
philosophy, reforms in Poland should be accelerated in order to strengthen the country’s
position both during the talks as well as after the accession to the European Union.
Supporters of that view claim that Poland should be interested in the soonest integration,
while the completion of the process depends predominantly on the pace of our internal
reforms. This approach may be seen especially in the position held by the Freedom Union
(UW). The second integration philosophy, whose essence has been formulated in the
programme of the PSL peasant party, stems from the assumption that everything
depends on the firm and non-compromising attitude of the negotiators who should try to
obtain the most favourable terms for Poland. Both philosophies view the integration
process as inevitable, although the conclusions drawn from that belief are entirely
different.”3
The attitude towards the unification processes and the negotiations is also influenced by
the level of information provided to the public. Sound information obtained about the
negotiations encourages support both for a positive evaluation of the government as well as for
the Union.
4. Social differentiation of opinions.
The attitudes held by various social groups towards integration with the European
Union may be described in the following way:
1. People who approve of the integration process and optimists are predominantly young
people, persons holding managerial positions, educated people, but quite often also the
unemployed and unskilled workers.
2. Particularly pessimistic attitudes may be observed among farmers and farm workers, as well
as among the supporters of the PSL peasant party and the Movement for the
Reconstruction of Poland (ROP).
3. The respondents’ level of income and place of residence have little influence over the
differentiation of opinions.
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4. The greatest fears concerning the consequences of integration have been voiced by farmers
and the trade sector, whereas the EU membership is the most strongly sought by the public
sector. The attitudes of the private sector are ambiguous: approval for integration is
accompanied by fears concerning the weakness of the Polish economy.
5. The unemployed declare a surprisingly strong support for the integration process. This
group, as well as young people, view integration as an opportunity to fulfil their aspirations
and interests.
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